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Abstract
Many democratic societies have become more politically polarized, with the U.S. as the main
example. The origins of this phenomenon are still not well-understood and subject to debate. To
better understand the mechanisms underlying political polarization, we develop a mathematical
framework and employ information-theoretic concepts to analyze empirical data on political po-
larization that has been collected by Pew Research Center from 1994 to 2017. Our framework can
capture the evolution of polarization in the Democratic- and Republican-leaning segments of the
U.S. public and allows us to identify its drivers. Our findings provide empirical and quantitative
evidence that political polarization in the U.S. is mainly driven by strong and more left-leaning
policy/cultural innovations in the Democratic party.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Political polarization is on the rise in many democratic societies [1–6], and yet the causes
of this relatively recent development are not well-understood. In the U.S. political polariza-
tion in terms of ideological distance between Republicans and Democrats has been growing
significantly, so that it is now less likely to find a liberal Republican or a conservative
Democrat [2, 6]. Several explanations for this finding have been put forward, including the
increasing influence of new media and the Internet, the rising income inequality, elite po-
larization, and demographic changes [4, 7, 8]. However, the growing use of the Internet, for
instance, might not suffice to explain the observed polarization effects because polarization
is largest among demographic groups that are least likely to use the Internet and social
media [3].
We focus on the basic forces of opinion formation and persuasion, and on how spreading
of political and cultural ideas within populations that lean towards Democrats or Republi-
cans can explain the evolution of political polarization, as observed in empirical data (see
Fig. 1). In this context, mathematical models are able to offer insights into the dynamics
of opinion formation, polarization, and related spreading processes [9–20]. To quantify and
characterize empirically observed polarization trends (see Fig. 1), we develop a mathemat-
ical framework of political change based on (i) individuals’ diffusion from one ideological
position to adjacent ones, and (ii) targeting of certain groups of individuals by influential
actors who spread their ideas to coalesce around political/cultural positions (henceforth
simply called “initiatives”). Influential actors are individuals or groups of individuals with a
particular political or cultural interest and leaders of interest groups, movements, or political
parties [8, 21].
We apply Bayesian Markov chain Monte-Carlo and information-theoretic methods to
quantitatively capture levels and changes of ideology distributions observed in the United
States. We find that that a single parameter suffices to describe the evolution of polarization
trends and we identify this polarization measure with the notion of initiative impact. We use
this measure to quantify relative changes in ideology distributions between Democratic- and
Republican-leaning segments of U.S. society. Our results suggest that the recent polarization
in the U.S. public is mainly driven by strong and more left-leaning policy/cultural concepts in
the Democratic party. Prominent examples of such concepts are mandatory health insurance
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Figure 1. Polarization in the U.S. public. We show the mean ideological position of the
Democratic- (blue) and Republican-leaning (red) segments of U.S. public from 1994 to 2017. Error
bars indicate the observed standard deviation in each year. It is evident that polarization has been
increasing in the past 15 years. The plotted data are based on a survey conducted by Pew Research
Center (see Ref. [6] for details).
and various forms of identity politics [21].
II. THE MODEL
In this section, we first define a general and abstract Markov chain model to mathemat-
ically capture empirically observed polarization trends (see Fig. 1). We briefly describe the
update dynamics and then focus on the characterization of the stationary distribution.
A. Definition of the ideology chain
We proceed in three steps to mathematically describe initiatives and the diffusion of
individuals from one ideological position to adjacent ones, with step 1 developed in Secs. II A
and II B, step 2 in Sec. II C, and step 3 in Sec. II D. In the first step, we consider a one-
dimensional chain which consists of N different states denoted by i (i ∈ {1, . . . , N}). Xi
denotes the fraction of the society in state i and hence
∑N
i=1Xi = 1. We use x = 2(i −
1)/(N − 1) − 1 to map the index i to an ideological position x ∈ [−1, 1]. These positions
represent the political spectrum in the following way: Very liberal individuals are located at
the beginning of the chain (i = 1, x = −1), whereas strongly conservative ones are found at
the opposite side (i = N , x = 1). We next consider the evolution of a hypothetical society
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in discrete time. We interpret Xni as the fraction of voters of type i at time step n ∈ N. For
every n, it holds that
N∑
i=1
Xni = 1 (1)
as a normalization condition. We employ a simple model of social interactions and assume
that individuals may change their ideological position through interactions with their ideo-
logical neighbors in the spirit of DeGroot’s model [22], in which transitions from one state
to another correspond to a social learning process in a group of communicating individuals.
At the aggregate level, in a particular time step, we assume that transitions occur from state
i to its nearest neighbors (i → i + 1 and i → i − 1) with some probabilities pi ∈ (0, 1) and
qi−1 ∈ (0, 1 − pi). For the moment, these transition probabilities are taken as given and
will be estimated later. At the boundaries of the opinion chain, the probability of becoming
more ideologically extreme is zero (q0 = pN = 0). The probability of staying at a certain
ideological position i is given by ri = 1− pi − qi−1. These probabilities form the transition
matrix P , with the following entries:
Pii−1 = qi−1, Pii = ri, and Pii+1 = pi. (2)
The probabilities in each row sum up to one, i.e.
∑3
j=0 Pii−1 = 1. The aggregate-level
behavior in our model can be traced back to individual behaviors in random matching and
bounded confidence models [23, 24] in which individuals adopt sufficiently close opinions
through communication (see Ref. [25] for a comprehensive account how such micro-level
assumptions in a social network turn into macro-level implications and Ref. [26] for a general
theory about such social interactions). The probabilities pi and qi are then the resulting
consequences at the aggregate level [27]. We show an example of an ideology chain with
N = 9 states in Fig. 2. For the sake of clarity, we do not include the self-loops described by
ri in this figure. We next focus on the dynamics of the model to account for the diffusion
of individuals from one ideology to adjacent ones. The initial values of all states are given
by Xn=0i = X
0
i . We refer to the row vector of all initial states as X
0 = (X01 , . . . , X
0
N). The
time evolution of the ideology distribution is then described by X0P n = Xn.
4
B. Stationary Distribution
We next determine the stationary ideology distribution. The update rule of state Xni
reads
Xn+1i = (1− pi − qi)Xni + qi+1Xni+1 + pi−1Xni−1. (3)
We are not considering periodic boundaries, and thus find for state i = 1,
Xn+11 = (1− p1)Xn1 + q2Xn2 . (4)
As n → ∞, we reach a stationary state. This implies that Xn+1i = Xni = Xi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and Eq. (4) yields X2 = (p1/q2)X1. Furthermore, based on Eq. (3) we find
by induction that [28]
Xi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pj
qj+1
)
X1. (5)
To fulfill the normalization condition of Eq. (1), we set X1 = 1 and divide each state Xi
by
∑N
i=1Xi. The stationary distribution X = (X1, . . . , XN) is unique since the transition
matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic [29]. Irreducibility follows from the fact that any
state in the Markov chain can be reached from any other state, and aperiodicity is satisfied
because of P nii > 0 for all n ∈ N [29].
The data that we show in Fig. 1 suggests that the ideology distributions of Democrats and
Republicans are clearly distinguishable, but also exhibit stronger overlaps in the nineties. To
capture both distributions with our model, we consider two opinion chains A and B in the
subsequent sections, and account for the impact of influential actors and issue innovations
in the third step.
C. Two Populations
In the second step, we introduce two populations in which members influence each other
regarding their ideological position. This allows us to examine how the distribution of
ideologies among Democrats and Republicans evolves over time. Specifically, we consider
two populations, A and B, with the corresponding stationary ideology distributions given
by Eq. (5):
XAi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pAj
qAj+1
)
XA1 (6)
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Figure 2. Polarization model. The political spectrum consists of N different states and is divided
in three groups: liberal, neutral, and conservative. For illustrative purposes, we set N = 9 in this
example. The transition probabilities are denoted by {pi}i∈{1,...,9} and {qi}i∈{1,...,9}.
and
XBi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pBj
qBj+1
)
XB1 . (7)
D. Influential Actors
In the third step, we introduce that influential actors of both parties transmit politi-
cal/cultural concepts that increase the cohesion within each population and thus also in-
crease the identity value of belonging to a population. The literature has identified the
importance of such channels and corresponding influential actors (see e.g. Refs. [8, 21]). In
particular, we assume that influential actors inject concepts (initiatives) that increase the
attractiveness of coalescing around ideological positions. Mathematically, we account for
this by describing the influence of such actors in the democratic and republican party as a
rescaling of the transition probabilities of Eq. (2) with λA and λB at a particular point in
time. We interpret λA and λB as the initiative impact in each party. That is, we interpret λA
and λB as the strength to coalesce around particular policy (or cultural) positions brought
forward by influential actors. Typically, when initiatives and the related cultural identities
are located to the left and right respectively, we would have λA > 1 and λB > 1. However,
it is also possible that initiatives can be related to the center or even to the opposite side
of the political spectrum which would imply that λA and λB can be smaller than one. This
will turn out to be important in our empirical analysis. Specifically, the impact of influential
actors on group A (e.g., Democrats) at a particular point of time leads to
pAi → pAi /
√
λA and q
A
i → qAi
√
λA. (8)
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Figure 3. The emergence of political polarization. The top panels show an unpolarized
(left panel) and a polarized (right panel) ideology distribution. Democrats are represented by
blue dots and Republicans by red ones. The bottom panels show the corresponding transition
probabilities which define the ideology distribution according to Eqs. (6) and (7) with N = 21
states. We rescaled the probabilities in the right panel according to Eqs. (10) and (11) by setting
λ = λA = λB = 1.13.
For opinion group B (e.g., Republicans), the rates are modified as follows:
pBi → pBi
√
λB and q
B
i → qBi /
√
λB. (9)
Based on Eqs. (8) and (9), we obtain the following modified stationary states:
XAi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pAj
qAj+1
)
λ−iA X
A
1 (10)
and
XBi+1 =
(
i∏
j=1
pBj
qBj+1
)
λiBX
B
1 . (11)
In the following sections, we show that this approach is able to replicate the empirically-
observed polarization. In principal, we could also assume values of λA and λB that depend
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on the position in ideology space. It is, however, possible to capture a substantial part of
the polarization effects with a constant value of λA and λB, as shown in Sec. III B.
III. RESULTS
Figure 4. Polarization in the U.S. general public in comparison with our model. For the
U.S. general public, we show the ideology distributions for Democrats (blue dots) and Republicans
(red dots). The dataset is based on a survey conducted by Pew Research Center (see Ref. [6]
for details). We initialized our model with the data of 1994 and only modified the distributions
according to a transition probability rescaling as described by Eqs. (10) and (11).
We now focus on the applications and implications of the polarization model introduced
in Sec. II. In Sec. III A, we discuss the onset of political polarization when influential actors
in each party introduce new political ideas. We outline in Sec. III B that our mathematical
framework is able to capture a substantial portion of the polarization effects which have
been observed in the U.S.-American public in the past 25 years. Once initialized, only the
two initiative impacts λA and λB are necessary to describe these polarization effects. We
use a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo approach to learn the parameter distributions
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of λA and λB from the empirical observations. Our results are consistent with a stronger
polarization of the Democratic wing in the society compared to the Republican one.
A. Emergence of political polarization
To study the emergence of political polarization in terms of our model as described in
Sec. II, we first consider an unpolarized society and then analyze the impact of influential
actors. The ideology space is given by the interval [−1, 1]. Moreover, we consider initially
normally-distributed (unpolarized) ideologies with mean µ = 0 and variance σ2 = 0.16,
as illustrated in the upper left panel of Fig. 3. We note that a distribution of ideologies
within a party does not uniquely determine the transition probabilities for the diffusion
of ideas (see SI). The reason is that, according to Eqs. (6) and (7), only their fractions
are relevant for the stationary distribution. To anchor meaningful transition probabilities,
we take the fact into account that voters with polar ideological positions are less likely to
undergo a transition to more moderate ideological positions. In addition, we would expect
larger transition probabilities in the more neutral ideology regime. These two properties
anchor the transition probabilities. We show an example of the corresponding transition
probabilities pA(x), qA(x), pB(x), and qB(x) in the lower left panel of Fig. 3. Also in the
case of our empirical application in Sec. III B, the indeterminacy regarding the transition
probabilities is resolved by taking the described effects into account.
We now incorporate the impact of influential actors on voter ideologies as described by
Eqs. (10) and (11), and rescale the transition probabilities accordingly to obtain
p˜A(x) = pA(x)/
√
λ, q˜A(x) = qA(x)
√
λ, (12)
and
p˜B(x) = pB(x)
√
λ, q˜B(x) = qB(x)/
√
λ, (13)
where we assumed λ = λA = λB. In the upper right panel of Fig. 3, we show that a rescaling
with λ leads to shifted normal distribution with mean µ(λ) and an invariant variance. In this
example, we set λ = 1.13. This finding suggests that a rescaling of transition probabilities
according to Eqs. (12) and (13) leads to a polarized society. The corresponding transition
probabilities and their rescaled versions are shown in the lower right panel of Fig. 3. As
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shown in the upper right panel of Fig. 3, it is possible to quantify polarization in terms of
∆(λ) which is 2µ(λ) in this example. Higher values of λ lead to an increase in ∆(λ). In
other words, polarization is monotonically increasing with initiative impact.
B. Polarization in the American public
Figure 5. Polarization in the U.S. politically-engaged public in comparison with our
model. For the U.S. politically engaged public, we show the ideology distributions for Democrats
(blue dots) and Republicans (red dots). The dataset is based on a survey conducted by Pew
Research Center (see Ref. [6] for details). We initialized our model with the data of 1994 and only
modified the distributions according to a transition probability rescaling as described by Eqs. (10)
and (11).
After having outlined the basic polarization mechanism in our model, we now focus on
the evolution of polarization as observed in empirical data on ideology distributions of US
citizens from 1994 to 2017. The dataset is based on a Pew Research Center survey [6].
For a detailed overview about the survey methodology, see Ref. [30]. Ideology distributions
are available for the Democratic- and Republican-leaning segments of the U.S. general and
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politically-engaged public. We initialize our opinion chain by using the empirical ideology
distributions of 1994 to determine the transition probabilities as defined by Eq. (2) with a
maximum-likelihood estimation. As in Sec. III A, we consider the case where the transition
probabilities are monotonically increasing towards the center. After the initialization pro-
cedure, the parameters λA and λB are the only two free parameters in our model. They will
describe the observed ideology distribution according to Eqs. (10) and (11). In the next step,
we use a Bayesian Markov chain Monte-Carlo approach to learn the distributions of both
parameters that best describe our data [31, 32]. The theoretical background is presented in
the SI.
After having initialized our model with a maximum-likelihood estimate with respect to
the empirical data of 1994, we perform a Bayesian Markov chain Monte-Carlo parameter
estimation for λA and λB. The data and the corresponding estimates of the ideology dis-
tributions are shown in Figs. 4 and 5. For 1994, the ideology distributions of Democrats
and Republicans are almost Gaussian and centered around the origin. In subsequent years,
polarization becomes more and more apparent. The division is much more radical in the
case of the politically-engaged citizens, compared to the general public. The plots also reveal
that, after the initial transition probability estimation, our two-parameter model is able to
describe the time evolution of the two ideology distributions quite well. Hence, a substan-
tial portion of the complex ideology and identity formation process can be captured by a
multiplicative rescaling of the transition probabilities according to Eq. (12).
For every year, we show the corresponding distributions of λA and λB in the SI in Fig. S2.
In addition, we illustrate the time evolution of λA and λB in Fig. 6. We interpret the initiative
impact λ as a polarization measure. This allows us to analyze the polarization dynamics more
systematically. The data presented in the upper panels of Figs. 6 and S2 make clear that the
democratic initiative impact λA increases substantially over time. The distributions of λA
are also getting broader. This is a consequence of additional effects which we cannot describe
by rescaling the initially-determined transition probabilities. Interestingly, the polarization
behavior associated with the republican initiative impact λB differs significantly from the
democratic one. In fact, in 1999 and 2004, the values of λB < 1 imply that the Republicans
are ideologically moving towards the center. Just after 2011, the values of λB > 1 suggest
that more right-wing initiatives have been transmitted. As a result, Republicans are moving
to the right in the political spectrum. Our results clearly suggest, however, that polarization
11
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Figure 6. Initiative impacts and relative entropy over different years. In the upper
panels, we estimated the initiative impact λA and λB as described by Eqs. (10) and (11). We see
that the polarization effects in the case of self-identified Democrats is larger than in the case of
their republican counterparts. In addition, we compute the relative entropy according to Eq. (14)
and show the results in the lower panels. PYear, P
′
1994, and P
′
λ are the distributions of the data,
of the data in 1994, and of our model, respectively. Blue dots represent Democrats and red ones
Republicans.
is mainly driven by issue forces acting on the Democratic wing of society.
In the last step, we compare the difference of the ideology distributions in each year in
terms of the of the relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler divergence)
G (PYear, P
′) =
∑
x
PYear(x) ln
[
PYear(x)
P ′(x)
]
, (14)
where PYear is the distribution of the empirical data in the respective year, and P
′ the one
of the model, or of another reference. We first determine the relative entropy of PYear with
respect to the empirical data distribution P ′1994 of 1994. The result is shown in the lower
panels of Fig. 6. We again see that the democratic distributions deviate much more from
the ones of 1994 compared to the republican distributions—another indicator of a larger
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polarization effect in the Democratic wing of the society. The insets in the lower panels of
Fig. 6 show the relative entropy of PYear with respect to the distribution of our model P
′
λ.
The small values of G (PYear, P
′
λ) indicate that our model captures the empirical distributions
well.
IV. CONCLUSION
We developed a mathematical framework and used information-theoretic methods to an-
alyze empirical ideology distributions of the Democratic- and Republican-leaning segments
of the U.S.-American public. Our framework is based on two forces: varying strength of ini-
tiatives in each party, and the corresponding diffusion of these concepts in society. The time
evolution of the observed ideology distributions is well-captured by only two parameters,
namely the two initiative impacts. We use these parameters as polarization measures be-
cause of their ability to describe the increasing gap between the ideology distributions. Our
analysis provides empirical and quantitative evidence that strong initiatives in the Demo-
cratic party have been the main drivers of the great divide that emerged in recent decades
between the Democratic- and Republican-leaning population. Future studies may apply the
proposed framework to quantify polarization trends in other countries.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION (SI)
Appendix A: Determining Transition Probabilities
According to Eqs. (10) and (11) of the main text, the transition probabilities pAi , q
A
i ,
pBi , and q
B
i of the discrete locations i ∈ {1, . . . , N} are not uniquely determined by a given
ideology distribution. The reason is that only the fractions pi/qi+1 are relevant for deter-
mining the stationary distribution of the ideology chain. To identify meaningful transition
probabilities, we account for the fact that voters with polar ideological position are less
likely to shift towards more moderate ideological positions. Furthermore, we expect larger
transition probabilities in the more neutral ideology regime. As initial values, we consider
the transition probabilities
pi =
0.2 · α
i for i < N/2,
0.2 otherwise,
(A1)
and
qi =
0.2 · α
i for i > N/2,
0.2 otherwise.
(A2)
We consider N = 20 states and we set α = 1.1 as starting values. The corresponding prob-
ability curves for the chosen starting values are shown in the upper left panel of Fig. SS1.
We discuss the influence of noise on transition probabilities and the resulting opinion distri-
butions in Sec. D. After this initialization, we apply a least-square optimization method to
obtain the transition probabilities that describe the Gaussian ideology distribution shown
in Fig. 3 of the main text. The corresponding transition probabilities and fractions pi/qi+1
are shown in the middle left and lower left panel of Fig. SS1, respectively. In the right
panels of Fig. SS1, we show that starting from another initial distribution may lead to dif-
ferent transition probabilities, but to the same fractions pi/qi+1. We note that according to
Eqs. (10) and (11) of the main text, a given ideology distribution is uniquely determined by
the fractions pi/qi+1.
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Figure S1. Determining transition probabilities. We numerically determine the transition
probabilities describing the Gaussian ideology distribution shown in Fig. 3 of the main text. In the
upper left panel, we start from initial transition probabilities as defined by Eqs. (A1) and (A2) to
apply a least-square optimization method to determine the transition probabilities of the Gaussian
ideology distribution. The results are shown in the middle left panel and the corresponding fraction
p(x)/q(x+∆x) is shown in the lower left panel. In the right panels, we repeat the same procedure by
assuming an initially uniform probability distribution. The fractions p(x)/q(x+∆x) are unaffected
by this choice.
16
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
λA
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
D
F
U.S. general public
1994
1999
2004
2011
2014
2015
2017
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
λB
0
20
40
60
80
P
D
F
U.S. general public
1994
1999
2004
2011
2014
2015
2017
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
λA
0
20
40
60
P
D
F
U.S. politically engaged
1994
1999
2004
2011
2014
2015
2017
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
λB
0
20
40
P
D
F
U.S. politically engaged
1994
1999
2004
2011
2014
2015
2017
Figure S2. Initiative strength distributions across time. We determine the probability
density functions (PDFs) of the initiative strengths λA and λB using Bayesian Markov Chain
Monte-Carlo. The values of λA become larger over time, whereas the values of λB are more
concentrated around unity.
Appendix B: Initiative Strength Distributions
In the main text we have outlined that the initiative strength λA of self-identified
democrats grew in the period from 1994 to 2017. In contrast, the initiative strength λB of
self-identified Republicans remained much more concentrated around unity and grew only
little in the last years. In Fig. 6 of the main text, we show the mean values and standard
deviations of λA and λB. These quantities were obtained from the corresponding Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte-Carlo distributions of Fig. SS2. These distributions also show that
the initiative strength λA increases with time. In addition, we observe the broadening of
the distributions that is also described by the increasing standard deviation in Fig. 6 of the
main text. This originates from the fact that not all details of the evolution of the ideology
distribution can be captured by the evolution of a single-parameter which we referred to
as initiative strength. In the case of self-identified Republicans, the corresponding distribu-
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tions of λB are more concentrated around the initial distribution of 1994. In addition, the
broadening is also less pronounced.
Appendix C: Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo
To compute the distribution of the parameter set θ ∈ {λA, λB} of the ideology chain as
defined by Eqs. (10) and (11) in the main text, we have to determine the probability distri-
bution P (θ|D) given our data D on the distribution of ideologies of self-identified Democrats
and Republicans. According to Bayes’ theorem, we express the posterior distribution
P (θ|D) ∝ P (D|θ)P (θ) , (C1)
in terms of the likelihood function P (D|θ) and the prior parameter distribution P (θ). We
assume that the likelihood function P (D|θ) is a Gaussian distribution
P (D|θ) ∝ exp
(
− E
2
2σ2
)
(C2)
of the error E with zero mean and variance σ2. We use the prediction of our model Xi(θ)
for a given parameter set θ and the actual ideology data Di (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20}) to compute
the least square error
E2 =
20∑
i=1
[Di −Xi (θ)]2 (C3)
as our error estimate in Eq. (C2) [31]. For a given prior parameter distribution P (θ),
we compute the posterior distribution P (D|θ) using Bayesian Markov chain Monte-Carlo
sampling with a Metropolis update scheme [31, 32]. After initializing the parameter vector
with θ0 drawn from the prior distribution P (θ), the nth iteration of the algorithm is defined
as follows:
1. A new parameter set θ∗ is drawn from the proposal distribution J (θ∗|θn).
2. The acceptance probability for θ∗ is computed according to (Metropolis algorithm)
r = min
(
P (θ∗|D)
P (θn|D) , 1
)
= min
(
P (D|θ∗)P (θ∗)
P (D|θn)P (θn) , 1
)
. (C4)
3. Draw a random number  ∼ U(0, 1) and set
θn+1 =
θ
∗ if  < r,
θn otherwise.
(C5)
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This update procedure implies that a new parameter set is always accepted if the new
likelihood function value is greater than or equal to the one of the previous iteration. That
is, if P (D|θ∗) ≥ P (D|θn). For the described Metropolis algorithm, the proposal distribution
J (θ∗|θn) must be symmetric. According to Ref. [32], a multivariate Gaussian proposal
distribution
J (θ∗|θn) ∼ N
(
θn|λ˜2Σ
)
(C6)
may be used as proposal distribution. The covariance matrix is denoted by Σ and the
corresponding scaling factor by λ˜. Every 500 iterations, the covariance matrix and the
scaling factor are updated, using the following update procedure [31, 32]:
Σk+1 = pΣk + (1− p)Σ∗,
λ˜k+1 = λ˜k exp
(
α∗ − αˆ
k
)
,
(C7)
where Σ∗ and α∗ are the covariance matrix and the acceptance rate of the last 500 iterations,
respectively. The remaining parameters are p = 0.25, Σ0 = I, and λ0 = 2.4/
√
d, where I is
the d×d identity matrix and d the number of estimated parameters. The target acceptance
rate is [32]
αˆ =
0.44 if d = 1,0.23 otherwise. (C8)
To evaluating Eq. (C4), we have to compute the least square error for the new proposed
parameter set θ∗ according to Eq. (C3) to obtain the likelihood function value P (D|θ∗)
based on Eq. (C2). To prepare for a convergence test, we set the variance of our likelihood
distribution to σ2 = 1/10. Convergence is measured in terms of the Gelman-Rubin Test [32].
Therefore, we consider four independent Markov Chains. Every chain is initialized with a
different random parameter set that is drawn from the corresponding uniform distributions.
The posterior parameter distribution is considered to be converged if the variance between
the chains is similar to the variance within the chain (Gelman-Rubin Test). In Fig. S3, we
illustrate the convergence behavior. We first let the four chains evolve for 104 iterations to
then apply the Gelman-Rubin Test. After reaching convergence, we generate 104 more sam-
ples without updating the covariance matrix. These samples define the posterior parameter
distribution.
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Figure S3. Convergence of Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo Parameter Estimation.
We show the evolution of the error as defined by Eq. (C3) for four different chains with different
initial conditions. The algorithm is considered to have converged to the posterior distribution if
the variance between the chains is similar to the variance within the chains (which is precisely
captured by the Gelman-Rubin Test) [32]. We first let the system evolve for 104 iterations to then
apply the Gelman-Rubin Test. After passing this convergence test, we generate 104 more samples
without updating the covariance matrix to obtain the final parameter distributions. Fluctuations
that appear for more than 103 iterations are a result of sampling values of λA and λB from the
true distributions (cf. Fig. SS2).
Appendix D: Influence of noise
To examine the robustness of the transition-probability rescaling, we allow that the tran-
sition probabilities pAi , q
A
i , p
B
i , and q
B
i of the discrete locations i ∈ {1, . . . , N} may be
subject to noise. To analyze the propagation of noise effects in the transition-probability
rescaling process, we consider relative fluctuations in the initial transition probabilities by
an amount of  ∈ [0, 1]. For example, we map each value of pAi to a value in the in-
terval
[
(1− )pAi , (1 + )pAi
]
. Specifically, let u ∼ U(0, 1) denote a uniformly distributed
random variable. We then map pAi to [1 + (2u− 1)] pAi . We apply the same mapping to
the other transition probabilities. In Fig. SS4, we show two examples of noise influences
( = 0.05 and  = 0.1) on the initial transition probabilities (left panels) and the rescaled
ones (right panels). In both cases, the noisy data (blue and red dots) are still in good
qualitative agreement with the unperturbed Gaussians (grey solid lines). This implies, that
the transition-probability rescaling is also applicable in the case of noisy data if the noise
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Figure S4. Influence of noise. We show the influence of noise effects by considering relative
fluctuations in the transition probabilities pAi , q
A
i , p
B
i , and q
B
i (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 21}) by an amount of
. For example, we map each value of pAi to [1 + (2u− 1)] pAi where u ∼ U(0, 1). We apply the
same mapping to the other transition probabilities. In the upper panels, we set  = 0.1; and we
set  = 0.1 in the lower panels. The perturbed data points are represented by blue and red dots.
The grey solid lines show unperturbed Gaussians. We rescaled the probabilities in the right panels
according to Eqs. (10) and (11) of the main text by setting λ = λA = λB = 1.13.
influence is not too large.
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